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Introduction
PURPOSE
Sociologists concerned with normative
order believe that the values men cherish
are important to study because they are
influential in the making of choices and
the determination of policies. If there are
common values among the members of
groups, and if these groups are powerful
in a society, then these common values
constitute significant data for an under-
standing of how that society acts and will
act.
For our purpose here, a value is an ele-
ment of the good life as seen by the person
who cherishes it. It is a preference that
serves as a standard for making choices.
The good life is of course a broad term
covering many segments of experience. In
this study the values that are chiefly im-
portant are those that define the good so-
ciety and the good world. Preferences of
these kinds particularly affect the relations
between two great powers like the United
States and the Soviet Union. Differing con-
cepts of the good world obviously will bring
societies into conflict, but it is also true that
even differences of value with respect to
domestic concerns tend to cause strain. No
nation altogether trusts another that runs its
affairs in accordance with values and norms
that are strange and alien.
In stressing the importance of values,
there is no intention of belittling the con-
cept of national interest as traditionally used
by political scientists. It is certainly true
that nations strive to acquire power. But it is
also true that it makes a difference how that
power is likely to be used-for what ends
and by what means. Given equal power, a
Nazi Germany is far more to be feared than
the United States.
This study was undertaken in the hope
that greater knowledge of the values held
by the principal elites on both sides of the
Cold War would contribute to our under-
standing of the present situation and to our
appreciation of future possibilities. It is im-
portant to know where the value compati-
bilities and the value incompatibilities are
between the two sets of elites, because the
goals and strategies of the foreign policies
of the two nations are bound to be influ-
enced by them.
THE ELITES
In speaking of elites we are not limiting
ourselves to the makers of governmental
policy. Rather, we are proceeding on the
1 Research assistants in this study were Gabor
Horvath and Dan I. Slobin, of The University
of Michigan.
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assumption that the decision-makers on both
sides need stable support for their policies
and that they can get it only by satisfying
a much broader stratum of the population.
This is obviously true in the United States,
and we believe it to be true even in the
Soviet Union. This broader group can be
broken up into several elites, as is done in
this study, but the members of all of them
are well-informed persons who, because of
their prestige or power, can exert influence
on the decision-makers. In the Soviet Union
these persons, though of many occupations,
will usually be members of the Communist
Party, and at relatively high levels. In the
United States these persons are not in the
same degree formally connected with one
another, but they have many informal con-
tacts with one another and have access to
channels to the national decision-makers. In
both cases the discussion of governmental
policies goes on among the members of
these elites, and their influence is felt at the
top.
The six elite groups chosen for investiga-
tion are very similar in the two societies.
Four of them are identical: (1) the military
elite comprises the general officers in the
armed services and the high officials in the
defense departments; (2) the scientific elite
consists of leading figures in the natural sci-
ences and in the professions of medicine and
engineering, including professors in uni-
versities and technical institutes and re-
search scientists employed by governmental
bureaus and industry; (3) the cultural elite
includes leading writers and artists, jour-
nalists, professors in the humanities and
social sciences, and prominent religious fig-
ures ; (4) the labor elite is made up of the
high officers in the labor union structure.
The other two elites of each society are
not defined identically. They include
people employed in government, business,
and the legal professions. Because of the
different structures of the Soviet and Ameri-
can societies, these persons have been
divided differently. In the Soviet Union we
differentiate between (5) the government-
Party elite and (6) the economic elite. The
former includes those of great political
power whether in the Communist Party or
in the governmental system or both; the
economic elite consists of those charged
with economic planning in the Union gov-
ernment or the republics and those manag-
ing large industrial enterprises. For the
United States we differentiate on another
basis. Several studies have shown that the
most important split in our government-
legal-business group is between the &dquo;cosmo-
politans&dquo; and the &dquo;locals.&dquo;2 The former are
likely to be those with broad horizons, who
realize the importance of foreign relations
and who live in the extended world made
possible by modem communication. The
locals, on the other hand, find the focus of
their interest in the community and are
leaders there. An illustration of the differ-
ence is the contrast in a small city between
the president of a corporation doing a na-
tionwide or worldwide business and the
owner of a drygoods store who has become
mayor. For brevity, we labeled these (5)
the cosmopolitan elite and (6) the provin-
cial elite. The only nonfederal officials to
be part of the cosmopolitan elite are state
governors.
Because of the widespread belief that,
since the &dquo;thaw&dquo; in the Soviet Union, crea-
tive writers were expressing ideas formerly
inhibited, Dr. Vera Sandomirsky Dunham
2See especially Robert K. Merton, "Patterns
of Influence," in Communications Research,
1948-1949, edited by Paul Lazarsfeld and
Frank Stanton (Columbia University, Bureau of
Applied Social Research Publications), New
York: Harper, 1949, pp. 180-219.
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was commissioned to analyze novels, plays,
and poetry. Her work, included as the sec-
ond part of this study (p. 386 below), is
conceived as a supplement to the data pre-
sented here on the Soviet cultural elite.
THE VALUE CATEGORIES
Since values defined as elements of the
good life or as preferences in terms of which
choices are made may be legion, we con-
fronted a formidable problem in conceptual-
izing a manageable number for this study.
The criterion adopted for selecting the value
dimensions was their relevance to the inter-
relationship of one society to another. Since
relevance is a matter of judgment, this was
a difficult criterion to apply. The 40 value
dimensions listed below are the fruit of
study of the sociological literature, discus-
sion with other scholars, much thought, and
considerable trial and error with our mate-
rials, especially on the Soviet side. The
grouping under three heads is purely for
convenience in the later exposition; it was
not part of the research design.
Value Dimensions Concerning the Economy
Mode of ownership of property
Planning and control
State’s responsibility for employment
System of allocation to jobs and training
Distribution of pecuniary and other rewards
Structure of economic incentives
Degree of obligation to work
Amount and kind of leisure
Role of labor unions
Value Dimensions Concerning Social and
Internal Political Affairs
Unitary or pluralistic society
Political and economic centralization or de-
centralization
Integration or separation of political func-
tions
Nature of political party system
Locus of public decision-making
Control of primary and secondary education
Criteria for scholarships and other aid to
students in higher education
Responsibility for health services
Church and state
Relation of mass media to government and
people
Surveillance of citizens
Degree of freedom of thought in political
and social affairs
Degree of freedom of thought in natural
sciences and technological matters
Degree of criticism of means
Race relations
Role of national and other cultural minori-
ties
Criteria for social status
Young and old in the society
Indoctrination of youth
Risk-taking
Relations of means to ends in the achieve-
ment of the good society
Ends of the society
Value Dimension Concerning External
Relations
Civil-military relations
Political and military relations to other na-
tions in the bloc
Aid to others
Relations to uncommitted peoples
Trade with members of the other bloc
Degree of trust toward members of the
other bloc
War as a means of national policy
The way to world order
Relation to international agencies
Inspection of this list will reveal that there
are four types of values that are not in-
cluded in any of the dimensions. ( 1 ) One
type of value was thought to be too dis-
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tantly related to foreign policy for inclusion
in this study, though differences were
thought to exist between American and So-
viet societies. Some of the values of this
type are those concerning family relations,
friendships and cliques, school curricula
and standards, and methods for the control
of delinquency and crime. (2) Another
type of preference was not dealt with be-
cause it was thought there would be no
significant differences between Soviet and
American societies. We believe elites on
both sides favor intelligent leadership, edu-
cation, aid to the needy aged, the applica-
tion of science to man’s problems, communi-
cation between classes and regions in their
own societies, and patriotism. (3) Another
type of value was excluded because of the
impossibility of fashioning truly common di-
mensions for the two societies. Because the
state is the only significant entrepreneur
in the Soviet Union, many questions that
arise in American society do not arise there
at all: &dquo;To what degree should scientific
development be a responsibility of govern-
ment ?&dquo; &dquo;To what degree should private
business be regulated by the government?&dquo;
&dquo;What should the rules be for the settlement
of labor-management disputes?&dquo; On the
other hand, the Soviet Union has problems
that have no counterpart in the United
States; for instance, &dquo;How’ much control
over factory managers should be exerted by
the local Party?&dquo; Other topics for which
meaningful dimensions seemed impossible
were: tax systems, especially when one con-
siders the past Soviet practice of exacting
forced loans; and freedom of movement
abroad, because for the Soviet Union this
is not just a matter of whether they want
their citizens exposed to foreign cultures,
but whether they want to use their limited
foreign exchange for this purpose. ( 4 ) One
value dimension, at least, was omitted be-
cause it would yield only predictable re-
sults-philosophical position. The Soviet
materials would overwhelmingly reflect ma-
terialism, whereas the American materials
would rarely express a philosophical prefer-
ence.
This study aims to make possible two
sorts of value comparisons: ( 1 ) compari-
son of the values of each elite with those of
the other elites in the same society; and (2)
comparison of the values of each elite with
the corresponding elites and with the other
elites in the other society. The first com-
parison will show to what degree, norma-
tively, there is a single elite rather than
separate elites in each society. The second
comparison will test the hypothesis that
elites of the same type in the two societies
will tend to be similar.
Research Method
CONTENT ANALYSIS
Content analysis is the term given to any
systematic attempt to codify the matter con-
tained in a defined set of communications.
One could perform content analysis on let-
ters, on periodicals, on books, on moving
pictures, or even on radio and television
programs. The method has been most
widely used on published materials, usually
with a view to obtaining measures of the
substantive material contained therein. This
has been its use in this study.
Content analysis was chosen in this case
because it has high scientific objectivity and
because materials were available on the
Soviet side as well as on the American side
to carry it out. The study of the Soviet
Union at arm’s length is very difficult, but
one source of material we do have is their
publications.
Few would question the validity of using
American newspapers and periodicals to get
at the values of members of elites who write
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TABLE 1
UNITED STATES PERIODICALS ANALYZED
a Except general and categoric exceptions; general exceptions are listed in text and categoric exceptions are
listed in Appendix A (p. 417).
b Only these three issues of Army were read because they contained the addresses at the annual convention of
the Association of the U. S. Army that were most suitable for our purposes. The other issues of this journal are
more purely technical than are the issues of Navy and Air Force.
C Navy did not begin publication until May 1958.
d Less than 0.5 of 1%.
signed articles for them or whose views as
expressed in speeches or interviews are
quoted. There might be more doubt about
using editorial material as representative of
the group or of the individual controlling
the periodical, but this will probably seem
legitimate to most people. Freedom of
speech is enough of a reality in the United
States for us to assume that editorials really
do represent the people for whom they pur-
port to speak. When we come to the Soviet
Union, however, the matter is quite dif-
ferent. Everyone knows that the Commu-
nist Party exercises a close surveillance over
Soviet periodicals. Is there any point, then,
in analyzing the contents of Soviet news-
papers and journals in the hope of finding
any differences among elites? Is it not a




SOVIET UNION PERIODICALS ANALYZED
The entire contents of each periodical were read with general exceptions as listed in the text
and categoric exceptions as listed in Appendix A (p. 417).
This is indeed a fair question, and a very
difficult one to answer. We want to make
it perfectly clear that we tried to do no
reading between the lines. In this study,
only explicit statements are analyzed. We
felt at the beginning of this study, and we
now believe that our feeling was justified,
that enough free play has developed near
the top of Soviet society since the death of
Stalin for elite differences of value to come
to light in Soviet periodicals. It is true that
the explicit differences on the Soviet side
are not striking, but in a good many of our
value dimensions they are real.
We emphasize that we are not assuming
that periodical content represents the views
of the readers. We are assuming only that
it represents the views of the editors, the
authors, and the persons quoted. These per-
sons can be identified as belonging to one
or another elite, and their value preferences
credited thereto.
PERIODICALS CHOSEN
The task of choosing the periodicals to
represent the various elites was not an easy
one. Advice was sought and obtained from
a number of scholars whom we do not name
because we do not wish to implicate them
in our choices, some of which they would
not approve. Tables 1 and 2 show the peri-
odicals analyzed for the United States and
the Soviet Union, respectively, the elites
they represent, the material in each that was
read, the sampling design for the issues for
each periodical, the number of items in
which value positions were expressed from
each periodical, and the percentage of the
total number of preferences that each peri-
odical represents.
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It is obvious that if the periodicals chosen
to represent the different elites do not in
fact do so, our results will be seriously mis-
leading. On the American side, the only
categorization about which we have serious
misgivings is that of the American Bar Asso-
ciation 7own in the provincial elite. At the
time this assignment was made, we knew it
was of doubtful validity, but we were so
anxious to have data from the influential
metropolitan lawyers that we decided to use
it. Since hindsight makes it appear probable
that the editorials in that journal do not
represent the provincial elite, it is perhaps
fortunate that relevant data in editorials of
the journal were so sparse that only 13 per-
cent of all data for the provincial elite are
drawn from them.
On the Soviet side there is, of course,
the general problem that the government-
Party elite tends to dominate all the others.
But insofar as the others do have an oppor-
tunity for independent expression, we feel
that the periodicals were accurately chosen
to represent the several elites.
The reason there are almost twice as
many recorded value positions in Table 2
as in Table 1 is that we felt we already
knew much more about American than
about Soviet society, and therefore should
put more of our effort into the analysis of
the latter. As it turned out, there are few
surprises in the American analysis, so that
we may regard it as serving three purposes:
( 1 ) It validates our method, since the re-
sults show close correspondence with inde-
pendent, more qualitative analyses by
American scholars.
(2) It gives a solid quantitative basis for
comparison of Soviet and American elites.
(3) It can serve as a base line for the
future study of social changes in the United
States. The same method can be used at
any later time to assess the shift in value
preferences.
In planning the content analysis, roughly
equal reading time was allotted to the peri-
odicals for each of the six elites. The re-
sults shown in Table 1 reveal that some
American sources were much richer per
hour of reading time in information about
value preferences than were others. The
scientific periodicals were particularly un-
rewarding. It was not intended originally to
use so many of them, but when it became
apparent that Science and The American
Scientist were going to yield so little, it
was necessary to find more specialized sci-
entific periodicals that had some editorial
or editorial-like material. The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists is much the richest in
the kind of material desired, but only a small
sample was taken here because the scientists
who support the journal are regarded by
other scientists as not wholly representative
of the profession. If the scientists are reti-
cent to reveal their preferences for the good
society, the labor elite is not. The American
Federationist proved to be an unexpectedly
plenteous source.
A word should be said about the excep-
tions noted in the column headed &dquo;Mate-
rial read&dquo; in Tables 1 and 2. The general
exceptions were the following:
( 1 ) Articles written neither by the editors
of the periodical nor by a member of an
elite.
(2) Articles by foreigners or exclusively
about a foreign country.
(3) Articles exclusively factual or tech-
nical in character, where no reference is
made to the role of the activities discussed
in promoting or detracting from the good
life.
(4) Articles of an exclusively historical
character not giving value preferences in the
period studied.
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(5) Biographies and obituaries.
( 6 ) In American periodicals, all book re-
views ; in Soviet periodicals, reviews of
books that would be excepted by points (1)
through ( 5 ) .
The categoric exceptions were made up
after inspection of each periodical. Appen-
dix A (p. 417) gives them in full, so that
another research team could follow our pro-
cedure exactly.
PERIOD STUDIED
The period chosen for study was May 1,
1957 to April 30, 1960. Three years seemed
a sufficient period, and April 30 was chosen
as the last feasible date for ending this proj-
ect. The fact that our project closed the
day before the descent of the American
U-2 plane in Soviet territory was completely
fortuitous. It was undoubtedly fortunate,
however, since our period was one of con-
siderable stability in Soviet and American
affairs. We started after the beginning of
President Eisenhower’s second term and
more than a year after the famous speech
by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. Marshal
Bulganin was still premier on May 1, 1957,
but Khrushchev was already the dominant
figure in the Soviet leadership.
THE VALUE POSITIONS
The most difficult methodological step of
all was the working out of a set of positions
within each of the 40 selected dimensions in
terms of which the material in the periodi-
cals could be coded. The essential dilemma
was to make each position specific enough to
be meaningful, yet general enough to be con-
ceivably taken by persons in either the Amer-
ican or the Soviet society. The difficulty is
illustrated by the political dimensions. The
Communist Party plays a tremendous role
in the Soviet Union; there is no counterpart
in the United States. We got around the
problem in several cases by speaking of &dquo;the
central political structure&dquo; or &dquo;the dominant
political power.&dquo; This enabled us to treat
the American federal government and the
combined Communist Party-Soviet govern-
ment complex as equivalent. Similar cir-
cumlocutions were necessary in other di-
mensions to make the value positions pos-
sible ones for the members of both societies.
The actual process of formulating the
value positions was a long one. We formu-
lated two to five positions for the various
categories from theory and general knowl-
edge, tried them out (especially on Soviet
materials), revised them, and tried them out
a second time. The final set of positions as
set forth in the tables for each dimension
was a product of three months of work.
Even after we had &dquo;frozen&dquo; our scheme,
situations came up that indicated the scheme
could have profited from further revision.
We recorded the position of a given elite
within a particular dimension as evidenced
by an article or editorial in a newspaper or
magazine no matter how long or how short.
The same elite might take positions within
several dimensions in the same article; in-
deed, the positions of several elites might be
reported. Thus, one article could yield a
great many coded positions or it might yield
only one. What we did not do was to code
the same position twice just because it was
reiterated in the same article. If for a dimen-
sion like Ends of the Society a particular
elite seemed to be emphasizing two posi-
tions, the coder had to decide which was
given the greater emphasis.
The assumption was not made that all
items in a periodical represented the elite
for which it had been chosen as representa-
tive. The only case in which this was true
was editorial matter. Editorials in the Amer-
ican magazine Science were assumed to be
speaking for the scientific elite; editorials in
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Pravda for the Soviet government-Party
elite. News stories were read for the state-
ment of positions by various elites. Thus,
an article in Nation’s Business might be
devoted to the position of labor leaders.
Signed articles or published addresses were
recorded as representing the elite of the
author. Articles and addresses by foreigners
and news stories about foreign comment
were not coded at all, nor were articles
about the preferences of nonelite persons.
It is important to note that we were not
interested in the present state of either
society but only in what the members of
certain elites thought it should be. Thus
articles with no preferences expressed or
strongly implied were omitted altogether.
Also, the preference had to be a contempo-
rary one. An historical account of what
Americans wanted in the thirties was not
relevant.
One feature of our system of analysis that
deserves mention is that criticisms of value
preferences were recorded. Thus, if Pravda
criticized the cultural elite for taking some
stand on freedom of speech, the cultural
elite was recorded as actually taking the
stand. There is of course danger of mis-
representation here; perhaps the charge has
no substance, perhaps no such stand has
been taken. We realized this danger but
thought it more likely that there is some
fire where there is much smoke. At any
rate, since in the Soviet Union this is one
of the few chances to detect departures from
the Party line, we decided we should not
forgo the opportunity. In subsequent tables
for the dimensions, the number of value
preferences derived from criticisms rather
than from affirmative statements is in paren-
theses below the principal figures. The
reader can therefore judge the degree to
which bias may have been introduced by
the practice of including the criticisms in
the principal figures. For those interested
in details, the instructions to coders are
given in Appendix B (p. 418).
A further point worth mention has to do
with positions intermediate to those we had
settled upon for each dimension. For those
dimensions where this was a frequent prob-
lem, we discuss it in detail when we present
the specific tables. Our general solution was
to allow the coder to record an ab when it
seemed to him that what was being said
could be accurately coded neither under a
nor b. When the tables were made up to
show the frequency of various preferences,
half of the recorded number at these inter-
mediate positions was distributed to the
positions on either side of them. This ac-
counts for the fact that many of our tables
give fractional figures at various positions.
RELATIVE PROMINENCE OF ELITES
The distribution of recorded preferences
according to the elite periodicals from which
they came did not of course correspond to
the distribution of the same items according
to the elites expressing them. Thus, the
American Federationist frequently stated
the position of employers, and the Saturday
Review commented critically on the Eisen-
hower administration. Table 3 shows the
total number of items in the United States
and the Soviet Union samples. A compari-
son of the left side of Table 3 with Table
1 shows interesting things about the Ameri-
can elites and their periodicals. Obviously
the journals of the other elites talk much
more about the cosmopolitan government
legal-business elite than do the journals of
this elite talk about the other five elites.
The New York Times and Fortune yielded
only 453 value preferences, whereas alto-
gether there were 715 value preferences re-
corded for the elite for which they speak.




balanced for both the scientific and cultural
elites: for the former, 176 and 184; for
the latter, 329 and 308. The periodicals of
the other three elites were generous in talk-
ing about other elites, but the tendency was
not reciprocated. One could interpret this
evidence as showing that, in the discussion
of value preferences, the cosmopolitan elite
is thought to be most important; the cultural
and scientific elites the next most important;
and the provincial elite, the labor elite, and
the military elite the least important.
On the Soviet side, the comparison of
the right side of Table 3 with Table 2 shows
that the disparities are not great for the
government-Party, the military, and the sci-
entific elites. However, they are great for
the economic elite and the labor elite, and
in opposite directions from that shown for
the United States. Evidently the other elites
are concerned to report the value prefer-
ences of the planners and managers in the
Soviet Union, no doubt as a spur to eco-
nomic effort. Even the labor newspaper
Trud rarely reports the value preferences of
anyone who can be identified as a member
of the labor elite. The great contrast be-
tween the two societies on the relative im-
portance of the labor elite (an unfavorable
balance in the Soviet Union of 7 to 1 and in
the United States of 7 to 6) probably re-
flects the greater attention our labor elite
gets because of its ability to bargain collec-
tively with employers and to strike. It is
difficult to account for the fact that the
value preferences of the Soviet cultural elite
are discussed by others more than the value
preferences of others are discussed by the
cultural press. Possibly this reflects a tend-
ency for the cultural elite to be the &dquo;bad
boy&dquo; of Soviet society. It is, in fact, the
most frequently criticized Soviet elite.
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
In this research we found that it was
much harder to get agreement among coders
on whether or not a dimension was involved
in a story or editorial than on what position
was being taken within a dimension. On
the latter, we obtained agreement between
coders more than 90 percent of the time
right from the start of our practice coding.
On the former, the results were most dis-
couraging for a long time. It turned out
that one trouble was the passing reference.
One coder would record a passing reference
to the one-party state as a preference for it,
whereas another would not. A rule adopted
on this subject (see Appendix B) helped a
great deal. Discussion and analysis of the
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differences between coders on their prac-
tice runs also increased reliability. We be-
lieve our statistical tables represent 80 per-
cent reliability.
Reliability is one of the greatest problems
in content analysis. How can we be sure
that the results shown in statistical tables
are not due to the idiosyncrasies of partic-
ular coders? How do we know that approxi-
mately the same results would be obtained
by other qualified researchers?
In this part of the study, we adopted
a statistical test of reliability rather than a
one-for-one test. We thought that what the
reader wanted to be assured of was that the
total result was reliable, not the coding of a
particular article. We believed that the
reader would be satisfied if it could be
shown that two coders, working over 100
issues of Pravda, let us say, would come out
with results on our 40 dimensions that
looked much alike and would give rise to
the same interpretations.
In our practice coding we computed per-
centages of agreement between coders as
follows: Each coder read the same material
and recorded value preferences at various
positions within the several dimensions. Let
us assume that one coder recorded 300 pref-
erences and the other only 275. Suppose
that for 200 of the preferences recorded by
Coder A there was a matching preference
by Coder B, but that the remaining 100
preferences recorded by A and the 75 re-
maining for B were unmatched. This would
yield us 400 matched preferences and 175
unmatched ones, or an agreement level of
approximately 70 percent.
In our practice coding we had great dif-
ficulty in getting these levels above 70 per-
cent when we covered relatively small
amounts of material. However, we made
the interesting discovery that the more ma-
terials coded, the higher the percentage of
agreement became. We found, for instance,
that if positions in which two or fewer re-
cordings had been made by each coder
were omitted, the reliability rose by at least
10 percent-a practice run that had yielded
65 percent agreement now showed 78 per-
cent agreement. This becomes understand-
able if it is assumed that whether or not a
particular statement deserves to be coded
at all is often such a close question that
there is an element of chance in the assign-
ments. Then, the more entries in the vari-
ous positions, the more likely that there will
be matches.
This is demonstrable statistically as fol-
lows : if the normal approximation is appli-
cable, then the sum of the matches would
be
where n is the average number of recordings
of the two coders and r is the number of
positions in terms of which the material is
coded. If there are 100 assignments by each
coder of a chance nature into 50 positions,
this formula says that the average sum of
the matches in the several positions would
be 60.4, which is 60 percent agreement. If,
now, the number of chance assignments by
each coder is 200, the agreement rises to 72
percent. Even if the normal approximation
is not applicable, the same increase of the
average sum with the increase of n occurs,
though the formula to prove it is much more
complicated.
We are not asserting that the assign-
ments of our coders were generally a mat-
ter of chance; not at all. When they both
believed that the item should be coded
within a certain dimension, the position cho-
sen showed very high agreement. But there
were numerous instances where one decided
that an item should be coded within a par-
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ticular dimension and the other decided it
should not be coded. This is where chance
enters, and although more decisions of this
sort arise as the volume of material increases,
still the formula proves that the greater the
total volume of material coded, the higher
the percentage of agreement in the end.
As shown, then, even if there are chance
fluctuations in the coding process, the more
material coded, the greater will be the re-
liability. This is true of the work of two
coders or of the work of the same coder
repeated after an interval. Since there are
2,154 items of information coded from the
American periodicals and 3,989 from the
Soviet periodicals, we are confident that we
have reached more than 80 percent relia-
bility.
The question of validity-of whether the
explicit statements in periodicals represent
the true positions of the several elites-is
of course moot. We can have much more
confidence on this score in the American
materials than in the Soviet materials. In
the latter case there is doubt both that the
government-Party elite allows the other
elites in the Soviet Union to voice their
preferences and that the government-Party
elite always expresses its own value pref-
erences frankly. We do not wish to pass
over the seriousness of this problem. We
can only point to the fact that different
positions are taken by elite members in the
Soviet Union and hope that these differ-
ences give some indication, however inade-
quate, of the true situation.
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR VALUE
DIMENSIONS
In the tables giving the result of content
analysis for the 40 value dimensions, the
various elites are represented by letters as
follows:
In these tables, salience percentages are
shown for each elite and for the combined
elites in each country. These percentages
are obtained by dividing the total number
of items recorded within a dimension for a
particular elite by the total number recorded
for all dimensions for that elite in Table 3.
They show the degree to which a partic-
ular value dimension is emphasized by par-
ticular elites. A comparison of the percen-
tages horizontally across any table shows
whether or not a particular elite is more or
less concerned than other elites. This per-
centage corrects for any possible over- or
undersampling of the value preferences of
particular elites.
The figures in parentheses represent the
number of criticisms rather than affirma-
tive statements contained in the figures just
above them.
All figures opposite value positions are
absolute numbers, not percentages. A word
of caution about reading these figures: to
determine whether one elite is more favor-
able than another elite to a particular posi-
tion, it is necessary to compare the figures
down the columns as well as across the
rows. Thus, as shown in Table 4, the Amer-
ican cultural elite (with 4 recorded prefer-
ences) may be more inclined to position b
than is the cosmopolitan elite (with 13 re-
corded preferences) since the proportion for
the former is higher.
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TABLE 4
MODE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE IN
STATISTICAL TABLES
The number of possible comparisons in
any of the tables on particular value dimen-
sions is so great that it is not feasible to
compute the levels of significance of dif-
ference of them all. However, in a critique
of the first draft of this study done by Dr.
Rolfe LaForge of the Oregon Research Insti-
tute, levels of significance were computed
by means of a chi-square test for all the re-
lationships about which assertions of dif-
ference or of no difference were made. The
standard of significance used by Dr. La-
Forge was p = 0.05. He found that a num-
ber of the statements originally made were
unjustified at that level, and these state-
ments have accordingly been deleted. He
also found a few cases where there were
differences in salience that had not been
indicated. Statements about these have
been added.
Results for Value Dimension
Concerning the Economy
For the sake of more organized discus-
sion, the data and interpretations of the
nine dimensions that are principally eco-
nomic in character are grouped in this sec-
tion. Each dimension is discussed in turn,
and then comments are made on them as a
group.
MODE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
Ideologically, this is the most focal of all
our dimensions. One expects that Soviet
elites will always express a collective prop-
erty preference, whereas American elites
will always express a private property pref-
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erence. In wording the value positions there
was no difficulty with the extremes, but it
was hard to find a meaningful middle posi-
tion that might occasionally be taken by
elite members on either side. Position b in
Table 4 represents less a definite point on a
continuum than a tendency to forsake the ex-
tremes. Any tendency on the part of the
elites on either side to indicate disillusion
with the dogma of their own society on
property principles would, however, be ex-
tremely significant.
On the Soviet side there was some doubt
whether position b should be used for an
article approving the transfer of equipment
from machine tractor stations to collective
farms. On the surface, this looks like a de-
nationalizing of property, but in fact it is
only putting the ownership in an agency
which is itself dominated by the Party and
which may in fact soon be brought into the
state farm system. Such items were there-
fore not coded here but rather in position c,
under political and economic centralization
and decentralization.
On the American side, position c in this
first dimension was used, even in the
absence of a flat statement of private prop-
erty preference, if there was strong criticism
of large federal budgets which support ac-
tivities competing with private business.
Table 4 shows that the elites on the two
sides, taken together, comment about equally
often on the mode of property ownership.
The difference is that this commentary is
concentrated heavily in one of the American
elites-the provincial-whereas the com-
mentary is more evenly spread through the
Soviet elites.
The Soviet materials show no break in the
Party line-all the preferences are in posi-
tion a. There is much more flexibility on
the American side, with 25 percent of the
items indicating a tolerance for a mixed
system of private and public ownership. It
should be noted, however, that a good half
of the items recorded in position b were
criticisms rather than affirmative statements.
More than half of all criticisms were di-
rected at the cosmopolitan elite for taking po-
sition b. In most instances it was the pro-
vincial elite that was disgruntled, as can
well be imagined from their heavy concen-
tration at position c. It will surprise many
that the American labor elite so rarely ex-
presses a property preference at all. It is
striking that, in the American Federationist,
the general principles that underlie the
American economy are rarely questioned.
The labor elite is inclined to a mixed system,
but it does not focus its attention on the
matter.
PLANNING AND CONTROL
This is a difficult category to deal with,
particularly on the Soviet side, because so
much periodical material deals with the ful-
fillment or lack of fulfillment of plans. Such
material was not coded since it does not ex-
press a value preference. In order to be
recorded, an item had to speak of the value
(or lack of it) of planning, or of the impor-
tance (or unimportance) of human dedica-
tion in the implementation. On the Ameri-
can side, position b (Table 5) was used for
those who favored national housing schemes.
As would be expected, Soviet periodicals
emphasize planning more than do American
periodicals. As compared with their oppo-
site numbers in the Soviet Union the mili-
tary and scientific elites in the United States
seem not to express preferences within this
dimension, which perhaps reflects the non-
involvement of these two groups in politics.
More than two-thirds of the American
items were recorded at position b, which
shows that American society has gone far




tant features of the economy. The labor
and cultural elites are unanimously in favor
of this, and the cosmopolitan elite markedly
so. The provincial elite shows a strong ten-
dency in the other direction-toward a
minimum of planning. The split in view-
point between the elites is very sharp.
Among the Soviet elites, this dimension
is understandably most salient for the eco-
nomic elite. The data again show well-nigh
complete acceptance of the Party line.
Three of the four exceptions recorded at
positions b and c are criticisms rather than
affirmative statements. In other words,
elite members are accused of having these
preferences, though we have found this out
only indirectly by the criticisms voiced by
other elite members. The lone member of
the economic elite who made an affirmative
statement of this kind is indeed an isolated
figure.
STATE S RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT
This dimension is not frequently discussed
by Soviet elites. They probably take the
state’s responsibility for granted. Most men-
tions of it in Soviet periodicals occur in
connection with criticisms of capitalist coun-
tries for unemployment. They simply say
approvingly that in their society the state
sees to it that no one is unemployed. Soviet
economic and labor papers sometimes indi-
cate that employment is not in fact full-
that when new machines are introduced that
throw men out of work, there are often long
delays in getting reassignments. However,
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TABLE 6
STATE’S RESPONSIB1LITY FOR EMPLOYMENT
there is no indication that any of the elites
condone this.
Table 6 shows little overlap in the value
preferences of the two sets of elites. Soviet
elites take positions a and b; American
elites tend to take c and d. Perhaps the only
contrast worth comment is that the labor
elite in the United States most frequently
discusses the state’s responsibility for em-
ployment, whereas in the Soviet Union it
is the economic elite. This possibly reflects
a greater authoritativeness in Soviet indus-
try. Although the provincial elite in the
United States seldom raises the issue, when




DISTRIBUTION OF PECUNIARY AND OTHER REWARDS
a Independent party workers constitute an occupation in the Soviet Union.
SYSTEM OF ALLOCATION TO JOBS
AND TRAINING
Since only five items occurred in the
American materials that were relevant to
this dimension, no significant comparison
can be made with the Soviet results. Table
39 in Appendix C (p. 420) shows that on
the Soviet side there is strong consensus on
the proposition that the government and the
Party have the right to allocate people to
jobs in the interest of social efficiency.
Though no table is presented at this
point, all the data that were coded on this
dimension, both Soviet and American, are
included in summary presentations, like
Table 11. This will be true for the materials




STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
DISTRIBUTION OF PECUNIARY AND
OTHER REWARDS
Positions c and d in Table 7 are two dif-
ferent ways in which inequality of rewards
may be justified. Position c expresses the
view of the Stakhanovite movement in the
Soviet Union or of the piecework system
in the United States. Position d represents
more of a status conception-that doctors,
let us say, are more important than farmers.
Table 7 indicates that the matter of re-
wards had much the same salience in the
Soviet periodicals as in the American. The
labor elite in each society is the most con-
cerned, with the Soviet labor elite more
concerned than the American. In fact, a
quarter of all the recorded information
about labor elite preferences in the Soviet
Union is on this dimension. As would be
expected, the Soviet economic elite also fre-
quently expresses concern with this dimen-
sion.
There is a wide range of value positions
on both sides within this dimension, and
hence considerable overlap. American elites
(especially the labor one) favor position
b--that, though there should be some in-
equality of reward, it should be kept to a
minimum. This is much less often expressed
in Soviet periodicals, but it represents about
16 percent of their total recorded value
preferences. The overwhelming weight of
Soviet preference seems to be position c-
high productivity should be rewarded much
more than low. Obviously this is consonant
with the drive of the Soviet Union to catch
up with the United States in industrial pro-
duction ; but, perhaps even more, it reveals
the regime’s desire to make its most produc-
tive workers contented and loyal.
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TABLE 9
AMOUNT AND KIND OF LEISURE
STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
This dimension proves much more fruit-
ful in the Soviet materials than in the Amer-
ican. Only the provincial elite discussed
this much on the American side, and they
showed an interesting tendency to split their
preferences equally between the self-interest
and the teamwork motives (Table 8). Evi-
dently industrial administrators and social
psychologists are in touch with one another.
It is interesting that the military elite tended
to take the position that emphasizes loyalty
to the society.
On the Soviet side it was expected that
for the government Party and the economic
elites this would be a dimension of some
salience, but it is perhaps surprising that it
is more salient for the military than for the
labor elite. Indeed, the minimal comment
by the latter indicates how little they at-
tempt to influence the practical philosophy
of the regime.
The dominant Soviet position is that
which emphasizes loyalty to the society.
The Soviet military elite are unanimous in
this position and the cultural elite almost
so. It is interesting that the ones who are
nearest to the problem-the government-
Party and the economic elites-take the
other positions more often. That 11 per-
cent of their preferences should be for the
self-interest motive is revealing. As an il-
lustration, in the September 1957 issue of
Teatr, Khrushchev criticized Stalin for not
paying sufficient attention to material self-
interest in economic motivation. He told the
story about a cousin of his who chopped
down an orchard because the taxes on it
were too high, and another story about
peasants who did not gather potatoes be-
cause the pay was too low.
DEGREE OF OBLIGATION TO WORK
This dimension proved to be completely
worthless on the American side, since there
are no recorded items on the subject. Since
no comparison can be made with the Soviet
results, the latter are relegated to Table 40
in Appendix C (p. 420).
AMOUNT AND KIND OF LEISURE
The value positions within this dimension
(Table 9) do not constitute a continuum.
The first three steps in a sense do, but the
fourth step is off in a different direction.
Positions a and b were considered necessary
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in dealing with the Soviet Union, and posi-
tion d was necessary for the United States.
The American results show (1) that this
topic is not much discussed, even in the
labor press; (2) that only two elites are
interested in it-the labor and cultural
elites; (3) that the labor elite prefers that
the work week be shortened; and (4) that
the cultural elite believes that the low
quality of American leisure pursuits is a
matter of concern.
The Soviet materials show an unexpected
concentration on the preference for more
leisure by reducing the work week. Only
the military elite dissents from this view,
probably because of their concern for in-
creased production of weapons. The general
result, however, is one that shows real con-
cern for &dquo;butter&dquo; as well as &dquo;guns.&dquo; The
upshot is that the Soviet society in general
tends to take the position of the American
labor elite.
ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS
In this dimension the American materials
are much richer than the Soviet materials.
This no doubt reflects the independent
status of unions in the United States as con-
trasted with their close tie-in with the state
in the Soviet Union. Because of their inde-
pendence in the United States, their role is
much more controversial.
It is interesting that in the United States
this category has the largest proportion of
criticisms in the information about value
positions-22 percent of the total. This
means that the subject is highly controver-
sial, since the partisans are frequently defin-
ing the positions of their opponents and
criticizing them.
On both sides, this dimension is most
salient for the labor elites. Since the Soviet
value preferences are so concentrated at
position a in Table 10, one can only be sur-
prised that any members of the govern-
ment-Party elite dared to take, even by
implication, position b, which includes the
right to strike. This boldness is perhaps
correlated with the fact that unions have
recently been given more power in the field
of recreation and have a comparatively free
hand in making so-called collective agree-
ments with management.
There was grave difficulty in coding the
American materials because value prefer-
ences were often not clearly position b or c.
In nonunion journals a favorable attitude
toward unions was coded position c unless
the union shop was specifically approved.
In The American Federationist, position b
was used where the union shop was either
explicitly or implicitly approved. When it
was not clear whether it was being ap-
proved or not, a bc was recorded. Where
the preference was being expressed for or-
ganizing white collar workers, position c
was chosen because at this time even ardent
unionists do not hope to achieve union shop
provisions with white collar workers.
Table 10 has no surprises for those famil-
iar with American society. The labor union
issue is most salient for the labor elite, and
next most salient for the provincial elite.
The labor elite takes the union shop position
more frequently than any other elite, al-
though the cultural elite is also somewhat
sympathetic to this position. The corres-
pondence of the positions coded in this table
to material from other sources about the
value preferences of American elites tends
to validate our method of analysis.
SUMMARY OF DIMENSIONS
CONCERNING THE ECONOMY
If the first nine dimensions we have con-
sidered are representative of economic mat-
ters in the two societies, then their elites
are approximately equally concerned with
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TABLE 10
ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS
a In Soviet Union refers to trudyacheeyesya.
such matters. Table 11 shows that some 25
percent of all recorded items fall within
these dimensions for the Soviet Union, and
23 percent for the United States, with con-
cern more evenly spread among the elites
in the Soviet Union. The infrequency of
expression of value preference in this area
by the American military and scientific elites
is noteworthy. The contrast with the Soviet
Union is explained by the fact that there the
scientific and military journals are strongly
influenced by the Party. Higher production
is emphasized across the whole gamut of
Soviet periodicals.
One broad generalization about the dif-
ferences between the two societies in the
economic sphere can be drawn from the
seven dimensions for which comparisons can
be made: differences within these dimen-
sions increase the more salient is the oppo-
sition between individual autonomy and
collective control. The three dimensions
within which there is the greatest overlap
of preferences between the two societies are
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Distribution of Pecuniary and Other Re-
wards, Structure of Economic Incentives,
and Amount and Kind of Leisure. This is an
interesting result because all three have to
do with motivation to work, and not with
the control of workers. To the degree that
there is some convergence on these subjects,
it may show that the Soviet Union and the
United States have discovered that indus-
trialized societies pose similar problems of
human engineering.
Two other dimensions, Mode of Owner-
ship of Property and Planning and Control,
show rigidity on the Soviet side, but some
flexibility on the American. Within the
property dimension there were many Ameri-
can expressions of approval for a mixed
economy, and within the other dimension
a very wide acceptance of the notion of
planning important features of the economic
system. The Soviet elites expressed almost
unanimous approval of state ownership of
property and inclusive planning. Evidently
many Americans find no fundamental con-
flict between collective effort and individual
autonomy.
Finally, within the dimensions State’s Re-
sponsibility for Employment and Role of
Labor Unions, there is complete divergence
between the two societies. In the Soviet
Union collective responsibility and control
are unanimously approved; in the United
States economic voluntarism is equally
favored.
Results for Value Dimension
Concerning Social and Internal
Political Affairs
Twenty-two dimensions are grouped
under this heading. Since they are inter-
dependent in many ways, they will be dis-
cussed in a summary at the end of their
exposition. One can differentiate two rough
subgroups, however. The first ten dimen-
TABLE 11 
SALIENCE OF ECONOMIC MATTERS TO THE ELITES
sions deal primarily with the broad structure
of the society and its institutions; the last
twelve deal somewhat more with the place
of persons and classes of persons in the
society and with collective orientations.
Brief reviews of the findings for each sub-
group will therefore be introduced.
UNITARY OR PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
As Table 12 shows, this dimension is
much more salient in the discussions of
Soviet elites than American, which may be
because the Soviet Union feels that its uni-
tary society is under attack. American
elites probably have this feeling much less.
The American pluralistic society is almost
two centuries old, and has established itself
not only in the eyes of its own people but in
the eyes of the world. Since the govern-
ment-Party system that gives Soviet society
its unitary character is less than fifty years
old, that society may feel less secure.
This dimension deserves a word of ex-
planation. The concern here is not with
political unity-that is taken care of by the
dimension Nature of the Political Party Sys-
tem-but with whether or not the political
system shares power with other types of
organizations and groups. The various
value positions show clearly what is meant.
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TABLE 12
UNITARY OR PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
We have not coded material on the desir-
ability or undesirability of independent
power exercised by labor unions here since
we had a separate dimension for the role
of labor unions.
The Soviet unitary society is so well
established that rarely does one find a flat
statement that there should be a single sys-
tem of power. Rather, two kinds of state-
ments occur with great frequency, which we
thought justified the use of position a: one,
where it is emphasized that all the people
are strongly behind the Party; the other,
where separate organizations, including the
armed forces, stress their unanimity with
the Party directives. After the fall of
Zhukov in 1958, the newspaper Krasnaia
Zvezda (Red Star) was particularly em-
phatic on this point.
The elites of the two societies have dia-
metrically opposed positions on this subject;
each believes in its own system. For once,
the American elites show a more unanimous
position than the Soviet elites.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CENTRALIZATION OR DECENTRALIZATION
This dimension is not really a continuum.
Originally we had only positions a and c in
Table 13. These proved adequate for deal-
ing with the Soviet materials but inadequate
for the American materials, and hence we
introduced the present position b, which
takes care of the views of those, for instance,
who favor federal aid on a broad front.
They oppose a strong states’ rights position
but do not favor anything so monolithic as
position a. (Questions of federal aid to
schools were handled under the dimension
Control of Primary and Secondary Educa-
tion and were not coded here.) It is a fair
question whether the preference among
members of Soviet elites for decentralization
of economic functions to the autonomous
republics and regions should come under
position c, as now, or under b. We left such
preferences under c because the Soviet
Union does not have the system of grants-
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TABLE 13
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION
in-aid that the United States has adopted on
occasion. As mentioned earlier, approving
references to the transfer of machine tractor
stations to collective farms were recorded in
position c also.
In the United States the provincial elite
is mainly concerned with this category, and
with a view to keeping the system as de-
centralized as possible. Perhaps it is signifi-
cant that on the Soviet side the govern-
ment-Party elite is strongest for decentral-
ization, though supported by the cultural
elite. The economic and scientific elites ap-
pear to be dragging their feet somewhat in
adopting the new Party line.
It is not a dimension of sharp contrast
between the two societies. Both are wrestl-
ing with the same problem, and the value
preferences concerning it are not perhaps as
different as is generally supposed.
INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION OF
POLITICAL FUNCTIONS
Like the two dimensions just discussed
and the two that follow, this one deals with
an aspect of the very complicated problem
of the relation between the political system
and the more inclusive social system. Al-
though this dimension seems to be con-
cerned only with the internal structure of
the political system, either the integration
or the separation of political functions is
preferred because of an assumed contribu-
tion to the welfare of the society.
The results in Table 14 are clear-cut.
The elites of the two societies express their
traditional positions without deviation. On
the American side, it is interesting that this
question is more salient for the provincial
elite than for the others, which perhaps
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TABLE 14
INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL FUNCTIONS
stems from the great anxiety of this elite
over &dquo;big government.&dquo; Its members hope
that the system of checks and balances will
slow the absorption of functions by the
federal government.
On the Soviet side, the great concentra-
tion on position b rather than a is signifi-
cant. Most of the material within this
dimension was gathered in the early part of
our period when the remains of the Stalinist
&dquo;cult of personality&dquo; were still being dealt
with. The preference for a system in which
&dquo;the members of a high political body
should share in the executive power&dquo; clearly
indicates the reaction to the single-person
dominance of the Stalin era.
NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM
There is remarkable contrast within this
dimension between the paucity of materials
on the American side and the richness of
materials on the Soviet side. And this
despite the fact that, for the Soviet periodi-
cals, we followed carefully the injunction to
coders to &dquo;code here [in position a] only
when at least a full sentence clearly indicates
the virtue of a single party.&dquo; If we had
coded value preferences expressed less fully,
we would have had many more of them.
Coded here were all references to the mono-
lithic character of the Party. In the continu-
ing criticism of the &dquo;anti-Party group&dquo; of
Malenkov et al. there were many statements
like the one in Pravda of July 6, 1957, in
which the Party declared itself &dquo;against the
scoundrels and fractionists who tried to strike
a blow at the unity of our Party.&dquo; The value
preference of the anti-Party group was
coded at position b.
The results of Table 15 show complete
unanimity among the members of American
elites on the multiparty system. It is per-
haps interesting, in view of the frequent
charge that American labor tends to support
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TABLE 15
NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM
only the Democratic party, to find high
salience of the multiparty preference in the
labor elite.
The salience is high for most elites on
the Soviet side. The small number of items
at position b, even though many of them
were criticisms rather than positive state-
ments, shows the overwhelming consensus
on the present party system at least as far
as explicit statements in periodicals are con-
cerned.
LOCUS OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING
This dimension brings clearly into view
the contrast between the two societies on
the political side. The epithet of &dquo;totalitar-
ian&dquo; hurled at the Soviet Union by the West
can here be tested.
It is first of interest that this is a more
salient category in the United States than
in the Soviet Union (Table 16). This may
be because elites in open societies like to
compare their value positions on so impor-
tant a matter as the process of decision-
making, whereas in closed societies the sys-
tem of decision-making is taken as given,
so that only occasional reinforcements of
the accepted positions seem called for.
Though the two societies are sharply con-
trasted in this dimension, there is approxi-
mately a 13 percent overlap. Some 11 per-
cent of the items on American elites take
position c, which is much like that espoused
by Walter Lippmann in his political writ-
ing. It is significant that 15 percent of the
Soviet items reflect the same position, stress-
ing the desirability of interaction between
the masses and the leaders before the latter
formulate basic policies. This is an im-
portant bit of convergence between the two
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TABLE 16
LOCUS OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING
NOTE: Freedom of information questions are coded here as relevant to the ability of the masses to contribute
to the formulation of policy.
societies. The cosmopolitan elite in the
United States and the cultural elite in the
Soviet Union take this position proportion-
ately most frequently. The American cul-
tural elite takes a more populist or radically
democratic position, whereas the govern-
ment-Party elite in the Soviet Union takes
a more authoritarian one. Thus the high
government elite is always more leader-ori-
ented than is the cultural elite, but the
general difference between the two societies
is such as to cause parts of the American
cosmopolitan and the Soviet cultural elites
to take the same position.
As in the previous four dimensions, the
American military elite rarely expresses
value preferences. This is consonant with
the tradition of the military not mingling
in politics. In three of the five preceding
dimensions, the Soviet military shows sharp
contrast. This is no doubt because it is
closely tied into the Party and therefore ex-
presses itself on governmental matters.
It should be noted that all the items coded
in position a on the Soviet side were criticisms
of the government-Party elite. These were,
in fact, items attacking the so-called anti-
Party group that had already been removed
from power.
CONTROL OF PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION
This is a very difficult dimension within
which to construct meaningful positions.
Really two different facets of the problem
are put together in our wording of the pref-
erences : one is the degree of ideological
control and the other is the degree of local
versus nonlocal administrative control.




CONTROL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
a This refers specifically to content of instruction.
The great weight of American preference
in Table 17 is for a system that maintains
local control but in which the local school
districts receive a good deal of aid from the
federal government. Evidently the members
of elites who express themselves in periodi-
cals are more in favor of this position than
Congress has been. The labor and scien-
tific elites were unanimous in their expres-
sion on this point. The cosmopolitan elite
was strongly of the same mind, in sharp
contrast to the provincial elite, which was
almost unanimously for the traditional sys-
tem of local control and support. The mili-
tary did not comment one way or another.
This is not a salient dimension on the
Soviet side. The positions taken are as ex-
pected, positions a and b. The cultural elite
is most concerned. The scientific elite is
the only one strongly for the giving of some
latitude to regional and local authorities,
perhaps because they feel that a better
chance for freedom of thought exists under
these conditions. Although this dimension
does not appear salient for the economic
elite, one coder reports that this elite more
than any other was writing about curricu-
lum content in Vestnik Vysshei Shkoly
( Journal of Higher Education. ) , urging that
more weight be given to industrial and
commercial subjects. However, they were
not particularly oriented toward the restrict-
ing of ideological guidance from the Party.
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CRITERIA FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND OTHER AID TO STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
CRITERIA FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND OTHER
AID TO STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
This is perhaps the most limited in scope of
all our dimensions, and one may well ask
why it was included. Our reasoning was
that the priority of values in a society will
be manifested by the criteria applied to the
selection of those who are to be helped
through higher education. The preferences
that are dominant will influence the charac-
ter of the society’s leadership in the next
generation.
Originally we had only four positions in
this dimension-the present position c in
Table 18 was lacking. Tests with American
materials quickly made it apparent that we
needed position c since so many items gave
equal emphasis to scholarly ability and eco-
nomic need; in fact, this is the most fre-
quently expressed value preference on the
American side.
The materials in this dimension are very
sparse, but they do perhaps show one thing
clearly-that there is a marked difference
between the two societies. The Soviet elites
believe that loyalty to the system and work
for the Party are the prime qualifications in
obtaining aid for higher education. This is
a very large group of potential scholarship
holders. No doubt if our categorization
had been finer, the several Soviet elites
would have shown differences on the cri-
teria for selection within this large category.
Some would no doubt have favored war
heroes, others heroes of industry, and still
others leaders in Komsomol (Party youth)
groups. American elites, on the other hand,
see scholarly ability and economic need as
prime requisites.
(Note: one coder reports that American
periodicals during the period were empha-
sizing the general importance of scholar-
ships for matching Soviet progress in science
and other fields, whereas Soviet periodicals
were urging that a larger proportion of bright
students have more work experience and
less exclusively academic experience. This
latter possibly shows a fear in the Soviet
Union that the young intellectuals will ac-
quire dangerous ideas if they are not kept
sufficiently close to the masses.)
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTH SERVICES
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTH SERVICES
This dimension is a continuum from
completely socialized medicine to as nearly
a private service-for-fee system as current
standards of humanitarianism will allow.
Table 19 shows that this was not a salient
value dimension in either society; however,
the pattern of salience among the elites on
the two sides was almost identical. In both
cases it was the labor elite that showed the
greatest proportionate concern. This is cer-
tainly natural since the lower socioeconomic
groups in both societies are the most fearful
that their health needs will not be met.
The American value positions cover a
wider range than do those of the Soviet.
Position c is preferred, but there is a scat-
tering of items on both sides in b and d.
All items on the Soviet side are recorded in
positions a and b, both of which represent
socialized medicine, the only difference
being one of degree. (One coder, from his
own knowledge of the Soviet Union, hazards
the opinion that positions c and d would
not appeal to members of the Soviet elites
because of the close tie-in with the dimen-
sion Surveillance of Citizens. He believes
that the doctors are used to check up on
economic malingerers and that, for this
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TABLE 20
RELATION OF MASS MEDIA TO GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE
reason alone, anything like a private system
of medicine would be looked upon with
disfavor. )
CHURCH AND STATE
Data on this dimension were so sparse
that significant conclusions cannot be drawn
from them. For whatever interest they may
have, they are given in Table 41 in Ap-
pendix C (p. 421).
RELATION OF MASS MEDIA
TO GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE
This dimension is closely connected with
the two dimensions on freedom of thought
that come later. The difference is that all
institutional preferences are coded here,
whereas more general preferences concern-
ing freedom of thought on different sorts
of matters are coded there. The salience of
this dimension is low, and it is consistently
so across the elites in both societies.
More difference between the societies
exists perhaps than appears from a casual
inspection of Table 20. The difference be-
tween position a, which members of the
Soviet elites take unanimously, and position
b, which most of the members of the Ameri-
can elites take, is great. It is the step from
a Party-controlled press to a press open to
all shades of opinion. There seemed to be
no way of constructing an intervening step
that would show finer shadings. Either one
believes in control or one does not. More-
over, some of the Americans preferred to go
further and see to it that various social and
political views obtain substantially equal
coverage.
REVIEW OF FINDINGS ON POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The nine of the first ten dimensions of
this section for which we could show sig-
nificant tables break into five in which
there is virtually no overlap in position
between the two societies, and four in
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DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS
which there is considerable overlap. In the
first group seem to be those that are most
closely related to the maintenance of the
political system in its essentials-Unitary or
Pluralistic Society, Integration or Separation
of Political Functions, Nature of Political
Party System, Relation of Mass Media to
Government and People, and Control of
Primary and Secondary Education. For
these five dimensions one can make a simple
generalization: members of American elites
are just as unanimous in support of a plu-
ralistic system as members of Soviet elites
are in support of a monolithic one. This
speaks well for the success of American
political principles, since the permissive
context would allow the taking of dissident
positions if the elite members should wish to
do so.
Two of the other four dimensions might
seem at first glance also to be essential to
the maintenance of the political system-
Political and Economic Centralization or
Decentralization, and Locus of Decision-
Making. Actually for both societies it is evi-
dent that these are taken as instrumental
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DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN NATURAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS
questions on which men may differ without
leaving the ideological fold. In the Soviet
Union there is no evidence that Party con-
trol is being questioned by those taking
minority positions; it is just a matter at what
point that control should be asserted. In
the American case, similarly, all positions
are compatible with democratic values.
The final two dimensions-Responsibility
for Health Services and Criteria for Scholar-
ships-deal with matters that are clearly not
crucial to the maintenance of the political
system. Americans naturally take variant
positions on them and this is evidently ac-
ceptable in the Soviet Union too.
SURVEILLANCE OF CITIZENS
Since there has been great interest in how
much surveillance has been lessened in the
Soviet Union since the advent of Khrush-
.chev, we included this dimension. Actually
it is so little discussed in the Soviet periodi-
.cals (only nine coded items in our sample)
that no significant comparison can be made
with the American data. The results are
given in Table 42 in Appendix C (p. 421).
DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS
This is a crucial dimension in the compar-
ison of the American and the Soviet soci-
eties. It is the one on which the most
emphasis is laid in intellectual circles. For-
tunately, value preferences with respect to
this dimension were frequent in the periodi-
cals on both sides. Position b in Table 21
was very carefully worked out in the hope
that by means of it we could detect signs
of restlessness in the Soviet Union.
There is no overlap in the positions taken
by the elites in the two societies-all Ameri-
cans take positions c and d, all Soviet writers
positions a or b. In both societies this
dimension is most salient for the cultural
elite, and in both societies they take a posi-
tion for more unfettered expression than do
the other elites, with the exception of the
scientific elite in the United States, which
is unanimously in favor of complete free-
dom. It is interesting that this category is
much less salient for the Soviet than for the
American scientific elite. Does this show a
proneness to tend to their knitting without
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DEGREE oF CRITICISM oF MEANS
bothering about larger societal questions?
The materials in the next dimension will
throw further light on this matter. The
high salience of this dimension for the So-
viet military elite results chiefly from much
discussion of the importance of political in-
struction in the armed forces.
DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN
NATURAL SCIENCES AND
TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS
We separated this dimension from the
preceding one on the ground that in the
Soviet Union there might be much more
freedom in this case than in the former.
Natural science and technology are realms
in which truth or falsity can be objectively
ascertained so that ideological controls are
harder to impose. Table 22 shows, how-
ever, that there is still a great gap between
the two societies on these matters. Whereas
there is unanimous preference for the posi-
tion that scientific truth is arrived at
through the clash of competing viewpoints
on the American side, there is no explicit
recognition of this viewpoint among the
Soviet elites. This is hard to credit, since
there is no doubt that Soviet scientists have
great prestige. Can it be that the prestige
does not confer the right to theoretical dis-
sent ?
Another contrast is that this dimension
is particularly salient for the American sci-
entific elite. This is not true on the Soviet
side, where the economic elite feels the most
concern. Possibly this is because they are
constantly worried about meeting produc-
tion quotas and feel that quarrels about the
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most effective technological methods would
only slow things up. The materials show
that they tend to be wedded to the tradi-
tional methods of manufacture and are not
eager to embark upon automation with the
headaches of transition.
The reticence of the Soviet scientific
elite on this subject can be variously in-
terpreted. It seems to us most likely that,
not daring to take position b, they remain
silent rather than to stultify themselves by
taking position a.
DEGREE OF CRITICISM OF MEANS
The two preceding dimensions were
meant to get at freedom of thought with
respect to ends and values of life. This
dimension was specifically designed to
catch the preferences at the level of means
(Table 23).
There is more overlap of the value pref-
erences of the elites of the two societies in
this dimension than in the two preceding
ones. It is interesting, however, that this
overlap comes about very largely in terms
of criticisms. All but one of the affirmative
statements of the American elites are in
position e. Positions c and d, which favor
both constructive and destructive criticism
with certain exceptions, are regarded by
the main body of the elite in both societies
as deviant-too permissive by the Soviets
and too restrictive by the Americans. In
such a case it is doubtful that one can speak
of much convergence in values.
Though their modal positions are far
apart, the cultural elites on both sides seem
to perform a sort of needling function here
as they did on degree of freedom of thought
in political and social affairs. They are both
inclined to be more concerned and to be
more permissive than are most of the other
elites in their own societies.
The fact that this dimension is no more
salient on the Soviet side than on the Ameri-
can side is perhaps itself significant. In the
period just before our study, when Stalin
was being downgraded, the government-
Party elite emphasized the necessity of self-
criticism and constructive criticism. It is
interesting that the military elite continues
that emphasis into our period-not so much
in urging criticism of purely military affairs
but in urging criticism of the relations be-
tween the Party and the military.
RACE RELATIONS
Although this dimension proved to be a
very live one in American society, it did
not prove so in Soviet society. There were
no recorded deviations from the principle of
full integration in the Soviet materials, but
the number of coded items was so small
that no significant comparison can be made.
The results are to be found in Table 43 in
Appendix C (p. 422).
ROLE OF NATIONAL AND OTHER
CULTURAL MINORITIES
The paucity of material on the American
side in this dimension bespeaks the great
change since the days of heavy immigration
before World War I. Though there was
adequate material on the Soviet side be-
cause of their many national minorities, no
significant comparisons can be made be-
tween the two societies. The data are given
in Table 44 in Appendix C (p. 422).
CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL STATUS
The criteria for according status or pres-
tige in a society are significant value pref-
erences because they show the kind of per-
sonal goals that seem important to the
persons holding the preferences. Table 24
shows that preferences in relation to social
status are more frequently expressed in So-
viet than in American periodicals; hence
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CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL STATUS
8 In the Soviet Union the Russian word chest is meant.
this is one of the salient dimensions for the
Soviet elites but not for the American (with
the exception of the scientists).
We started out with only the present
positions a, c, d, and e, but it quickly be-
came apparent that we needed the posi-
tion b-respect for the military heroes-
especially in the Soviet Union.
The high proportion of members of Amer-
ican elites who prefer that respect be given
to intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achieve-
ment is in part a function of the launching
of the Soviet Sputniks in the fall of 1957.
Most of the emphasis in the American ma-
terials thereafter was on the need for giving
scientists and other intellectuals more status
in the society-much of it expressed by the
scientists themselves. The provincial elite
was at the same time emphasizing the need
for higher rates of production.
More than 70 percent of the Soviet pref-
erences recorded are in the position c-
status for productive work. This is certainly
consonant with the great drive for produc-
tion to catch up with the United States.
The emphasis on intellectual, artistic, or
spiritual achievement is much less than it
is for the American elites. But perhaps the
greatest contrast is the emphasis on political
achievement in the Soviet Union compared
with the complete lack of any mention of
this by American elites. The same general
contrast holds for military achievement.
Neither side thinks that possessions should
confer status.
YOUNG AND OLD IN THE SOCIETY
By introducing this dimension we hoped
to get some impression of whether the
several elites saw their societies as needing
more or less young blood in the leadership,
or, to put it conversely, less or more wisdom
from the older generation. Unfortunately,
this proved to be a very nonsalient dimen-
sion for the American elites, and only a little
more salient for the Soviet elites. We show
these nonsignificant results in Table 45 in





This dimension was introduced on the
theory that the attitudes toward the devel-
opment of the younger generation are ci-u-
cial for determining the type of society.
If the older generation believes that the
younger should be indoctrinated with the
nation’s ideals, a very conforming society
may result; if it believes that the young
should be allowed to fashion their own
ideals to some extent, a more experimental
society is possible.
Table 25 shows that this is a subject of
greater salience for the Soviet than for the
American elites. Had it not been that the
Advisory Council on Naval Affairs was con-
ducting a moral leadership program during
the period-a program that was supported
in the magazine Navy we would have
found almost no references to this subject
in the American periodicals. Most of these
Navy articles were coded ab because they
seemed to favor both the military and civil-
ian leadership in the program. They there-
fore contribute to both position a and posi-
tion b. The American cultural elite seems
to have misgivings about the indoctrination
of youth, which fits with their strong em-
phasis on freedom of thought.
The great predominance of preference
among the Soviet elites is for position a-
which of course accords with the Party
line. None of the elites shows much incli-
nation toward deviation. It was not always
easy to decide between positions a and b
because agencies other than the govern-
ment or Party-the family in particular-
were frequently urged to help in the indoc-
trination process, but in most cases the
writers seemed to want the main responsi-
bility to lie with the instrumentalities of the
political system. The three main institutions
that carry out the official indoctrination are




a Willingness to accept untried innovations can be included.
seem to think other important topics are
being neglected), the armed forces, and
the Komsomols. The slogan that is used to
justify this indoctrination is: In the light of
the decisions of the plenum of the Central
Committee, we should increase the ideo-
logical work among youth.
RISK-TAKING
This dimension is somewhat different
from the others. The willingness or unwill-
ingness to take risks is usually regarded as
a characteristic of the person rather than of
the society. However, because it seemed an
important background variable in relation
to foreign policy strategy and goals, we in-
troduced it into the study. Actually we
looked for comment in the periodicals on
the desirability or undesirability, for the
welfare of the society, of taking risks.
The dimension proved a little more salient
for the Soviet elites than for the American
(Table 26). On both sides the most fre-
quent value preference was for the middle
position-a belief in taking risks but not on
matters vital to the society’s welfare. But
the Soviets were much bolder than the
Americans in taking position a, which
authorizes taking risks even on vital matters.
This may be one of our most important
findings. It is interesting that it is not the
government-Party elite that shows this bold-
ness but the military and, to a lesser degree,
the cultural elites. The contrast between
the government-Party and the military
elites is one of the most striking things dis-
covered on the Soviet side.
Noteworthy is the salience of this cate-
gory for the Soviet economic elite. Discus-
sion of innovations in technological process-
es and economic organizations accounts for
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TABLE 27
ENDS OF THE SOCIETY
a An explicit statement is not necessary for this position if the whole tenor of the item is in this direction.
this and may also be a subtle way for the
managers to express a desire for greater
freedom of action in running their plants.
It is interesting that not a single Soviet
preference for position c is affirmatively
stated, all being criticism of other elites for
having shown this play-it-safe preference.
This is evidently not a posture that accords
with the dominant climate of opinion in the
Soviet elites. There is some reluctance in
the American elites also, but not nearly so
striking, to affirm a policy of caution
openly. Much more light will be thrown on
the matter of Soviet risk-taking by a re-
search study presently in process for Proj-
ect Michelson. This is being carried on by
Professor Jan F. Triska of Stanford Univer-
sity. It covers twenty-nine crises faced by
the Soviet Union since World War II.
RELATION OF MEANS TO ENDS IN THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOOD SOCIETY
This dimension proved to be much more
discussed by the Soviet elites than by the
American. Since only six items were coded
from the American materials, the data have
been relegated to Table 46 in Appendix
C (p. 423).
ENDS OF THE SOCIETY
Table 27 has the largest number of en-
tries of all the tables. This was the dimen-
sion most frequently coded in the Soviet
materials and the third most frequently
coded in the American. The positions here
contain one that is mixed (position b), be-
cause Soviet writers have a tendency to
state that both an increase in technological
power and an improvement in the standard
of living are desirable, and to say it in the
same sentence and without any greater
weight on one side than on the other. The
chief difficulty in assigning value statements
to the positions, as given, was in the field
of science. We adopted the rule that state-
ments emphasizing the need for more appli-
cations of science should be coded position
a, but statements emphasizing more theo-
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retical work or basic research should be
coded position d. It was perhaps unfortu-
nate that these two positions were not
placed next to each other so that we could
have assigned a combined position, after-
ward to be divided between the two, as we
did for a few other dimensions. In what
may seem a strange decision to Americans,
we decided to code in position d a few
statements that Soviet society needed
more thorough indoctrination in Marxism.
The most striking difference in the pro-
portions in the value positions taken by the
elites of the two societies is revealed by the
fact that more than half of the American
items emphasized an increase in intellectual,
artistic, or spiritual achievement, whereas
less than one-fourth of the Soviet items did.
This is perhaps natural since the United
States is more mature as an industrial so-
ciety, while the Soviet Union still tends to
stress the importance of material progress.
Materially, Americans tend to feel they have
arrived.
The percentages of salience reveal two
striking facts. The Soviet economic elite
is much more likely to express itself on the
ends of the society than is the American
provincial elite, and the American scientific
elite is more likely to do so than is the Soviet
scientific elite. Since neither the Soviet
economic nor the American provincial elite
emphasizes intellectual, artistic, or spiritual
achievement, the former difference is mainly
a matter of a greater sense of urgency in the
Soviet case about matters of production and
distribution. The extraordinary salience of
this dimension for the American scientific
elite is almost certainly due to the concern
aroused by the early Soviet successes in
satellites. The low degree of comment on
ends of the society by both labor elites is
striking.
REVIEW OF FINDINGS ON
SOCIETY-INDIVIDUAL RELATIONS
Although we recorded value preferences
on twelve dimensions of this kind, only
seven of them produced data that could be
significantly compared between the two so-
cieties. Four of these seven can well be dis-
cussed together.
The extreme divergence between the two
societies in the two freedom of thought di-
mensions conforms to expectation. Nor is
the limited overlap on Degree of Criticism
of Means surprising, given the fact that this
is seen by Soviet leaders as a technical mat-
ter, not as a question of ideological ortho-
doxy. The Soviet system, like the American,
needs criticism if it is to work well. But the
Soviet leaders are much more opposed to
destructive criticism than are the American.
Their accusations of those who practice it,
however, may show that it is a growing
phenomenon in the Soviet Union. The most
surprising result in this general area is on
Indoctrination of Youth. Here one might
expect full-scale opposition between the two
systems on the same ground that there is
opposition on the control of education. This
is not the case because some members of
American elites do not look upon indoctrina-
tion in the democratic set of values as limit-
ing freedom of thought. On the other hand,
a few Soviet leaders seem willing to have
the indoctrination carried out chiefly by
nonpolitical institutions and associations.
The fact that there is considerable over-
lap on Risk-Taking is not indicative of any
basic consensus on substantive matters. Per-
haps important is the finding that Soviet
elites are more willing to take risks than
American ones.
On Criteria for Social Status and on Ends
of the Society, there are some points of con-
vergence and some points of interesting dif-
ference. The points of convergence may be
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SALIENCE OF SOCIAL AND INTERNAL
POLITICAL MATTERS TO THE ELITES
explained by the fact that both are large,
complex, industrial societies that need high
levels of productive efficiency and many
kinds of professional skill. Hence techno-
logical progress and intellectual achieve-
ment are taken as ends, and the qualities
that contribute to them are admired. The
differences in these dimensions may be cor-
related with the stages in development of
the respective societies. The United States
has already achieved a high level of per
capita wealth and need not be so concerned
with a high level of consumption as is the
Soviet Union. It can therefore direct more
of its energies toward a high level of intel-
lectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement.
Another difference in situations is impor-
tant : the Soviet Union feels that it is mak-
ing its own way against great odds; the
United States has arrived. Hence the Soviet
elites admire those who have made great
political and military contributions, whereas
American elites show little of this orienta-
tion. With the passing of time, the maturing
of Soviet society, and the realization of some
of its economic and political goals, one may
expect that the already considerable con-
vergence in these dimensions will increase.
SUMMARY OF DIMENSIONS CONCERNING
SOCIAL AND INTERNAL
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Table 28 shows that internal politics and
social affairs are more salient to the Soviet
elites than the American. This is perhaps
the result of the complementary fact that
external political affairs are less salient. In
a society in which foreign policy is con-
ducted with little reference to public
opinion, it is not surprising that internal
affairs bulk larger in the value preferences
of the elites than they do in the United
States.
It is interesting that there is fairly con-
sistent parallelism in the salience of these 22
dimensions taken as a group among the
elites on the two sides, with a single excep-
tion. The American military elite is much
less concerned with these matters than is
the Soviet military elite. This is almost
certainly because of the close tie-in between
the government-Party and the military elites
in the Soviet Union. The high officers are
expected to become political as well as
military leaders.
We have been able to contrast the two
societies on sixteen dimensions relating to
social and internal political affairs. On
seven of these there is practically no con-
vergence between the two sets of elites.
These involve the degree of &dquo;unitariness&dquo; of
the society, its party system, the govern-
mental structure, control of the mass media
and of education, and freedom of thought,
both on political and social affairs and in
the natural sciences and technological mat-
ters. Why these seven dimensions hang to-
gether may be somewhat different for the
two societies. In the Soviet case the leader-
ship in a single party may be the dominant
value, and the unitary society, the govern-
mental structure, the control of mass media
and education, and the doctrine of a single
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truth all spring from it. In the United
States, on the other hand, the pioneer situ-
ation made for a pluralistic society, from
which have sprung a governmental system
with checks and balances, a multiparty sys-
tem, local control of education, mass media
almost exempted from control, and freedom
of thought.
There is some value convergence between
the elites of the two societies in the other
nine dimensions. It is perhaps significant
that of the four included structural dimen-
sions, two are seen as means-values (Cen-
tralization or Decentralization, and Locus
of Decision-Making), and two are only
loosely linked to the political system
(Health Services, and Criteria for Scholar-
ships). All but one of the other dimensions
deal with rather vague relationships be-
tween the person and his society-criticism
of means, risk-taking, status, ends of the
society. It is understandable that there
should be dispersion of value preferences on
these dimensions in each society, and hence
some overlap. Only the mild convergence
on Indoctrination of Youth was quite un-
expected.
There is confirmation in the tables of this
section for the widespread belief that the
cultural elite in the Soviet Union is the most
dissident one. They are being mentioned by
other elites as believers in destructive criti-
cism, they believe in more freedom of
thought on political and social issues, they
are more willing to involve the masses in
decision-making, and they emphasize more
than others intellectual, artistic, or spiritual
achievement as ends of the society.
Results for Value Dimensions
Concerning External Relations
The nine dimensions analyzed in this sec-
tion are, in general, arranged in an order
that proceeds outward from the society to
the organization of nations in the world.
Thus civil-military relations within the na-
tion, because they affect defense, are taken
as the first step, followed by relations to
members of the society’s own bloc, to un-
committed nations, to members of the op-
posing bloc, and to the United Nations. One
dimension, Aid to Others, could just as well
have been put in the preceding section,
since &dquo;others&dquo; may be anyone from one’s
neighbor to the peoples on the other side
of the globe, but we placed it here because
the most interesting data on it are those that
relate to other nations.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The value positions in this dimension
form a sort of circle. Position a and position
d in Table 29, for instance, are both prefer-
ences in which the civil side is dominant
over the military, but they are different in
the degree of separation between the two.
Our periodicals yielded relatively little
information on this subject. The military
was the only elite in either society for
which it had any degree of salience. The
spokesman in Krasnaia Zvezda took the
Party line more strongly than did the gov-
ernment-Party elite itself-in favor of con-
trol of the military by the civil side through
Party representatives in the armed forces.
One can of course speculate that this is the
Party using Krasnaia Zvezda to control the
military, rather than the military speaking
for itself. The military elite in the United
States tended to favor a situation in which
they had a strong advisory role but not one
equal to the civil authorities in policy-mak-
ing. The Soviet preference makes for a more
monolithic system, the American for a more
independent military that is yet subordinate




POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS TO
OTHER NATIONS IN THE BLOC3
This dimension was introduced in an at-
tempt to get at the value preference that the
various elites have for ties with other nations
on their own side of the Cold War. Such
preferences are slightly more salient in the
United States than in the Soviet Union.
This tends to be true of the whole group of
dimensions dealing with external relations,
probably for two reasons: (1) American
elites are better informed than Soviet elites
on most topics, especially those dealing with
external matters; and (2) other Soviet elites
are not encouraged by the government-
Party elite to comment on foreign relations.
The high government and military elites
are the ones for whom relations to others in
the bloc are more salient (Table 30), as
would certainly be expected. But the posi-
tions of the two societies are in sharp con-
trast. On the Soviet side there is absolute
unanimity on the preference for a mono-
lithic front &dquo;under our leadership.&dquo; (Note
that we coded items here even when Com-
munist China was included in the &dquo;us.&dquo;)
There is a little wider range of preference
among the members of the American elites,
but still the predominance of position b is
well established. (Coders were allowed to
3 The two blocs were defined as follows: (a)
Soviet Union&mdash;Communist China, Poland, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea,
Outer Mongolia; (b) United States&mdash;Britain,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Den-
mark, Iceland, Netherlands, Belgium, West Ger-
many, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece,
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines,
Nationalist China, Japan, South Korea.
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POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS TO OTHER NATIONS IN THE BLOC
infer position b when there was strong em-
phasis on the need for working together
closely in the bloc.) It is interesting that
there was about as much deviation from this
position one way as the other, toward the
monolithic position and the loose bloc posi-
tion.
The divergence in this dimension between
the elites of the two societies does not augur
well for their future relations. The value
positions buttress present realities, and pres-
ent realities are two blocs quite differently
constructed. The opponents in the Cold
War will therefore probably continue to be
dissimilar, and this may make rules of a
peaceful game all the more difficult to work
out.
AID TO OTHERS
This dimension needs more explanation
than most. The value positions in Table 31
are gradually enlarging circles. Each step
signifies that the humanitarian impulse runs
at least as far as described, although one does
not know whether it runs further. Hence
comparisons have to be very carefully made.
The sort of statement that constitutes a
value preference within this dimension is
also a problem. We adopted the rule that
simple statements of fact-that so many
tons of wheat had gone to India from the
United States or from the Soviet Union-
would not be coded unless they were ac-
companied by statements indicating ap-
proval or emotional involvement.
The high total salience of this dimension
on the American side results in part, but
by no means entirely, from the fact that
New York Times editorials were the princi-
pal source of data on the cosmopolitan elite.
The Times supports almost all the charitable
drives in New York through editorials, and
these account for many of the 29 entries
in position a by the cosmopolitan elite. But
even without these, the total American sali-
ence figure would be six percent.
With the exception noted, the various
elites on each side are strikingly uniform
in the salience percentages. This would
seem to show that aid to others is a broadly
human problem on which all feel compe-
tent to express themselves. American hu-
manitarianism tends to run much further




a Aid is interpreted broadly to include more than economic aid.
Soviets. There are no expressions of willing-
ness to give aid on a worldwide basis in
the Soviet periodicals, but 20 percent of
the American items take this position, with
the cultural elite taking it most frequently.
For the other American elites the modal
position is c.
The Soviet data do not show sharp dif-
ferences in the scope of humanitarianism of
the several elites, though this impulse seems
less broad in the economic elite than in the
others. This may reflect their awareness of
the needs at home.
RELATIONS TO UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES
We tried with this dimension to discover
whether uncommitted peoples (those neither
in one’s own bloc nor in the enemy bloc)
are seen as societies to be forcefully brought
to one’s own side, or let alone, or something
in between. The value positions in Table
32 speak for themselves except for the nota-
tion that anticolonial statements were re-
garded as evidence of position c.
There is more convergence here between
the elites of the two societies than in most
categories. Though the Soviet items tend
toward position a and the American toward
position c, there is an overlap of roughly
38 percent at position b. Many on both
sides want to persuade uncommitted coun-
tries and peoples to their value positions.
They do not want to subvert them on the
one hand or leave them alone on the other.
This convergence is, however, obviously not
one that will necessarily make for friendly




RELATIONS TO UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES
TRADE WITH MEMBERS OF THE
OTHER BLOC
We did not have a dimension for foreign
trade in general because we thought the
Soviet side was so complicated by relations
with members of their bloc that the meaning
of the data when gathered would not be
clear. However, we felt that value prefer-
ences regarding trade with the other, or
enemy, bloc were meaningful and could be
interpreted intelligibly. Unfortunately, we
found little material on the subject in the
periodicals on either side. The few data are
given in Table 47 in Appendix C (p. 423).
DEGREE OF TRUST TOWARD MEMBERS
OF THE OTHER BLOC
This was one of the most difficult dimen-
sions in which to code the materials, both
American and Soviet, because positions a
and c are so hard to separate. Many articles
took the view that, though the other side
should be approached with great caution
because of probable untrustworthiness, they
should still be approached in a friendly
manner. The decision for coding rested on
whether the writer saw any realistic hope
for the development of mutual trust or
whether he did not. Since whole articles,
not single statements, were being coded, the
decision had to be based on the weight of
emphasis.
Table 33 shows that this dimension is
more salient for American than for Soviet
elites, which is true even of the political
elites on each side ( government-Party
versus cosmopolitan). And the greater
salience for the American side is entirely in
the expression of lack of trust. Since during
the period under study Soviet policy was
to express friendship for the West, and since
the Soviet press is closely controlled, few
expressions of strong distrust appeared. Not
so in the American press. One would expect
the United States military elite to be espe-
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TABLE 33
DEGREE OF TRUST TOWARD MEMBERS OF THE OTHER BLOC
a In &dquo;a&dquo; and &dquo;b&dquo;, &dquo;bloc&dquo; means rulers, not people.
cially preoccupied with this dimension, and
it is no surprise that its value position was
one of heavy distrust. It may come as a
surprise to those who did not read of Walter
Reuther’s meeting with Khrushchev to find
the labor elite so solidly mistrustful of the
Soviet Union. The cosmopolitan, the sci-
entific, and the cultural elites in the United
States were all more inclined to the friendly
approach.
The paucity of comment on this dimen-
sion by the provincial and the cultural elites
on the American side and by the economic,
scientific, and cultural elites on the Soviet
side is worthy of mention. The high politi-
cal and the military elites on both sides
naturally expressed value positions on this
subject.
The general relations between the two
societies show much convergence on posi-
tion c-that the two societies should ap-
proach each other in a friendly spirit. Ap-
proximately a 38 percent overlap occurred
on this position. If words can be trusted to
represent real value preferences, this is
hopeful.
WAR AS A MEANS OF NATIONAL POLICY
We are here at the heart of the most im-
portant question in Soviet-American rela-
tions. Do the elites believe their country
should resort to war on slight provocation,
on great provocation, or not at all? This was
a very difficult dimension on which to con-
struct value positions. Position a in Table
34-preventive war-was no problem. But
positions b and c proved not wholly satis-
factory. Position b-be ready to retaliate
but do not start a war-tends of course to
be the commonest one. We wanted to dis-
criminate it from a more pacifistic position
that yet would not be so far in that direction
that it would not be found expressed in the
materials. Actually the coders were often
puzzled over whether an item was an expres-
sion of b or c. The last phrase in position c
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TABLE 34
WAR AS A MEANS OF NATIONAL POLICY
was almost never expressed. Hence we have
put it in parentheses. Usually the more paci-
fistic items simply stated that nuclear war is
too horrible to contemplate and that we
should not engage in it. The issue of the
alternative was not raised.
Perhaps the most striking thing in this
dimension is the tremendous difference in
salience between the two societies. Some
of this, but by no means all, can be laid to
the preoccupation of the American military
elite with this subject. The figure would be
higher still if we had not scrupulously
avoided coding articles that simply took the
military establishment for granted as a tool
for making war; there had to be explicit
emphasis on the need for defense. Two
facts probably explain the military’s 37 per-
cent salience: (1) because of the American
tradition of the nonparticipation of the mili-
tary in politics, they do not express value
preferences in other dimensions as freely as
do the Soviet military; and (2) because of
the integration of the civil and military in
the Soviet Union, discussion of war is
played down in military periodicals at a
time when the Party line emphasizes coexis-
tence. The second reason would also ac-
count for the lower salience of this dimen-
sion for the other elites on the Soviet side.
The unanimity with which members of
the Soviet elites take position b shows the
power of the Party line. The same result,
except for the scientific and cultural elites,
is achieved on the American side, but from
a more open process of discussion. The
American scientific and cultural elites are
the ones that have the greatest horror of
nuclear war. This is probably because the
former understands best the devastation that
would be wrought (and some have feelings
of guilt), whereas the latter is the most
sensitive to the human values that would be
sacrificed.
THE WAY TO WORLD ORDER
The several positions within this dimen-
sion were thought to represent the logical
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TABLE 35
THE WAY TO WORLD ORDER
alternatives for reaching a stable interna-
tional system. Two difficulties were en-
countered in coding. Position c in Table 35
was often expressed without any explicit
statement of the part in the parentheses.
We adopted the rule that if the coder
thought this part was implied, he could
code it; if he thought that the writer did
not see coexistence as a solution to the prob-
lem of world order, he should not code it
on this dimension at all. The other diffi-
culty was that &dquo;the gradual convergence of
value systems&dquo; was frequently not expressed
as a condition of the world rule of law. The
American Bar Association journal was no-
table in this respect. However, we coded
here all items where world order through
world law was the preference.
Table 35 shows slightly more Soviet than
American salience for this dimension.
Qualitatively the great difference is that,
whereas the emphasis in the United States
material is about equal on positions c and e,
in the Soviet materials it is heavily on posi-
tion c. This undoubtedly reflects the power
of the Party line in the Soviet Union. Co-
existence is the official doctrine. The failure
of any item to be recorded in position d on
the American side is puzzling. This would
certainly be the Quaker position, and it is
surprising that belief in the efficacy of peace
movements did not find expression.
Another surprising datum is the reticence
of the American cosmopolitan elite. There
is proportionately more interest in the sub-
ject in both the cultural and the provincial
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TABLE 36
RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
elites. The provincial elite score is some-
what of a freak because of a campaign in
The American Bar Association journal
sparked by one of its presidents. (This
makes it clear that this journal was not a
good choice to represent the provincial
elite. ) Perhaps the American cultural elite
is more inclined to think about long-term
issues than is the cosmopolitan elite.
On the whole, the fact that 41 percent of
the American and 90 percent of the Soviet
items express the coexistence value prefer-
ence, even though one may suspect that the
latter reflects Party control, is a sign of con-
siderable convergence.
RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
In this dimension our anticipations were
wrong. We expected that we would need
positions e and f, but Table 36 shows that
we did not. We had supposed that there
were elite members in both the Soviet Union
and the United States who looked askance
at the whole United Nations effort, but, if
there are, their value preferences were not
expressed in our sample of materials. It is
perhaps significant that the American elites
are proportionately much more concerned
with the relation to international agencies
than are the Soviet elites. The difference
in salience here is because only the govern-
ment-Party elite seems willing to speak up
on this subject, whereas on the American
side more than half the recorded value posi-
tions are the expressions of elites other than
the cosmopolitan. This no doubt reflects
the Communist Party’s closer control over
foreign policy statements than over domes-
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TABLE 37
SALIENCE OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS TO THE
ELITES
tic statements. The unanimity on the Amer-
ican side is also impressive. All American
elites seem to be &dquo;sold&dquo; on active partici-
pation in international agencies. It should
be noted that the items coded in position a
were not always concerned with the United
Nations. When, for instance, an article was
enthusiastic about participation in the Inter-
national Geophysical Year, and there was
an undertone of approval of international
cooperation generally, the item was coded
in position a. If there was any indication of
reservations on other types of cooperation,
the item was coded in position c.
Though few items were recorded on the
Soviet side, their distribution among the
positions is interesting. Approximately
equal weight is given to participation in
agencies as they are, to participation with
hopes of changing the character of one or
more agencies, and to participation only in
those that &dquo;are in conformity with our
goals.&dquo; This represents much less satisfac-
tion with international agencies than is ap-
parent on the American side. The distinc-
tion between positions c and d is that two
kinds of difference are represented among
agencies-one the technical versus political,
the other the favoring-our-system versus the
not-favoring-our-system. The chief agency
in point on the latter for the Soviet elites
is the International Labor Organization,
whose system of representation by employ-
ers and government does not suit the Com-
munist economic pattern.
SUMMARY OF DIMENSIONS CONCERNING
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Table 37 shows clearly that the nine di-
mensions just discussed are far more salient
in the published comment of American elites
than they are in the published comment of
Soviet elites. The 35 percent and 16 per-
cent totals are of course the converse of the
combined percentages of Tables 13 and 36.
That is, if the Soviet elites are more inter-
ested in internal affairs, the American elites
must be more interested in external affairs.
Our general explanation for this is that, in
a tightly controlled society, more of the
necessary information for the maturing of
value preferences even among elites will be
available on internal than on external mat-
ters, and there will be greater opportunity
for their expression.
The value positions taken in these dimen-
sions show that the two sets of elites have
different conceptions of the way their own
society and their own bloc should be orga-
nized for external relations. The Americans
prefer a military establishment separated
from politics but subordinate to the civil
government; the Soviets like one that is in-
filtrated by political representatives. The
Americans like a bloc in which there is co-
operation among autonomous nations; the
Soviets prefer a bloc that is monolithic. The
societies also differ in their attitudes toward
the world beyond their own blocs. Ameri-
can elites evidence a wider-ranging humani-
tarianism than do Soviet elites, and they see
the United Nations and other international
agencies as much more worthy of their full
participation. One can speculate that the
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Soviet elites feel their country and their
doctrine are more alien to the rest of the
world than do the American elites. This
would cause them to organize their own so-
ciety and bloc more tightly, to be less hu-
manitarian toward other peoples, and to be
suspicious of the United Nations.
Despite the differences enumerated, there
is considerable convergence of value posi-
tions in some of the dimensions. One can-
not assume, however, that such convergence
conduces to peace. The data in each case
have to be carefully interpreted.
The fact that both sides tend to believe
that &dquo;uncommitted countries and peoples
should be persuaded to our value position
by active efforts on our part&dquo; does not mean
that there may not be bitter struggles. But
surely this is more hopeful than had both
sides expressed a preference for revolution-
ary movements in uncommitted countries.
For the dimensions dealing with trust,
with war, and with the way to world order,
interpretation depends wholly upon the de-
gree of sincerity in the explicit statements.
In all three cases there is a good deal of
convergence toward the positions (1) that
the members of the other bloc should be
approached in a friendly spirit to overcome
mistrust, (2) that the nation should go to
war only if attacked, and (3) that &dquo;the best
way to world order is through coexistence
until our system prevails through its inher-
ent virtues.&dquo; If these preferences could be
taken at their face value, there would be
much hope. Americans believe that their
own elites are expressing themselves frankly.
They doubt that the Soviet elites are simi-
larly genuine in their expressions. Even if
these doubts are well-founded, there is still
a consideration worth pondering. Can ex-
pressions of value positions that are given
such vide dissemination as are those of the
Soviet elites be flouted without danger of
loss of support in the masses? Do the elites
in any sense become prisoners of their own
value statements?
The Relation of the Elites to
One Another
We have, in the course of our discussion,
pointed out the relation of the elites to one
another within and between societies for
particular dimensions. We have also
showed the percentages of all their value
preferences that fall within each of the
three broad groups of dimensions that we
have used. In this section we shall see
which of the elites hang together, so to
speak, and which are far apart in their in-
terests and thinking.
It would be most desirable to know which
elites most frequently take the same posi-
tions in each of the 40 dimensions and
which do so least frequently. Then one
would have a good measure of their affinity
or lack of it. To carry out this analysis is,
however, a large undertaking and very time-
consuming. It would require that every
figure opposite a position in each of the 40
tables be reduced to a percentage of the
total value preferences recorded for each
elite in that table. Once this had been done,
a complicated calculation would have to be
made to discover the degree of overlap of
each elite with each of the other five in the
society. The magnitude of the task seemed
beyond our capabilities at the time, and it
is doubtful in any event whether the infor-
mation obtained would be worth the cost in
time and effort.
A second best and a much easier analysis
is to discover to what degree the several
elites see the same dimensions as salient.
This analysis shows us whether the labor
elite and the cultural elite, for example, are
paying attention to the same aspects of their
society. We will not know whether they
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have the same value preferences within the
several dimensions, but we will know
whether they distribute their attention and
interest similarly across them.
The differences in salience shown in Table
38 were calculated from the salience per-
centages of the elites for each of the 40
dimensions. Each figure in the table is the
mean of the differences in salience percen-
tages between the elite represented by the
column and the elite represented by the
row. On the right side of the table, for
instance, one sees that the mean salience
difference for the American labor and cul-
tural elites is 1.25 percent. This means that
on the average throughout the 40 tables
these two elites differed by only 1.25 per-
cent in salience. The United States data are
given in the upper right half of the table,
the Soviet Union data in the lower left half.
The italic figures on the diagonal between
are the mean salience differences between
the corresponding elites in the two societies.
The table shows that the cosmopolitan
and the cultural elites are the focal ones on
the American side. Their mean differences
in salience from other elites have lower
averages than the other four-~0.93 percent
and 0.91 percent. Put the other way around,
this means that the provincial, labor, mili-
tary, and scientific elites are less typical of
the general run of interest and attention of
the society. It must be recalled that we are
speaking only of salience, not of value posi-
tion.
The table shows that the links are close
between the cosmopolitan and the cultural,
the cultural and the scientific, the cultural
and the military, and the military and sci-
entific elites. Of these four, the only sur-
prising pair is the cultural-military. Exami-
nation of the data shows that it was their
high common salience on ends of the society
more than anything else that produced the
result. Their preferences were somewhat
different-more inclination toward techno-
logical mastery by the military and more
toward intellectual, scientific, and artistic
achievement by the cultural elite-but they
are alike in expressing frequent concern
about societal ends.
The two elites least related to the others
are the provincial and the labor elites, and
they are not closely related to each other.
The truth of the matter is that these elites
appear to be more self-centered than the
other four. They show high salience on the
dimensions that particularly concern their
own positions in society. The cosmopolitan,
military, scientific, and cultural elites show
more detachment.
The Soviet results are in some ways simi-
lar to the American, in some ways different.
The government-Party elite, surprisingly
enough, is no more focal than the cultural
elite. They have the same mean salience
difference. In this case, however, the eco-
nomic elite (which roughly corresponds to
the American provincial) is very close to
the government-Party rather than being dis-
tant from it. On the Soviet side the only
elite that is quite different in its run of
interest and attention is the labor elite.
The cause seems to be much the same as
with the American labor elite. The dimen-
sion called distribution of pecuniary and
other rewards was far more salient for the
Soviet labor elite, for instance, than for the
others.
Finally, there is the interesting fact that
the mean of all the salience differences
among the Soviet elites is 1.55 percent and
for the American elites 1.65 percent. This
says nothing about the controls exercised by
the Party (though these are undoubtedly
strong) on the value positions taken by the
various Soviet elites. It simply shows that
the Soviet elites are more similar to each
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TABLE 38
MEAN DIFFERENCES IN SALIENCE BETWEEN
ELITES
other in what they attend to and react to
than are the American elites.
Table 38 also indicates that different
elites are more similar in the same society
with respect to saliences than are the cor-
responding elites in the two societies. Every
figure on the diagonal is larger than any
figure in the rest of the table. Thus, one’s
society is more powerful in influencing one’s
attention and interest than is membership
in a particular elite. We should add, how-
ever, what has been repeatedly noticed in
discussing the various tables: that there is
a tendency for the corresponding elites on
the two sides to have a similar position with
reference to the other elites in the same
society, even though the percentages of the
corresponding elites may be quite different.
For instance, in Table 7 (distribution of
pecuniary and other rewards) the salience
is highest for both labor elites, but the
American figure is only 5 percent whereas
the Soviet is 24 percent. Thus the salience
difference between the American labor elite
and the Soviet labor elite is much greater
than the differences between the American
labor elite and other American elites, but
the patterning among the elites in each
society is somewhat similar.
This same point is brought out by putting
the percentages in Tables 11, 28, and 37
into graph form as shown in Fig. 1. We
are thus able to see to what degree the
pattern of salience among the elites in one
society parallels the pattern of salience in
the other society. It is striking that there
is great similarity for the economic cate-
gories and the categories dealing with ex-
ternal relations, but only mild similarity for
the categories concerning social and internal
political matters. This would suggest that
for great modem societies there is much
convergence on who needs to be interested
in economic matters and foreign affairs, but
that there is diversity on who needs to be
interested in social and internal matters.
The greatest contrast shown by Fig. 1 is
beween the two military elites. Whereas
the Soviet military elite expresses itself fre-
quently on social and internal political affairs,
the American military elite does not. This
difference is reversed on matters concerning
external relations, where the American mili-
tary elite shows predominant interest.
Co~nclusiort
It is impossible to summarize the results
of a study such as this. Any attempt to do
so would merely amount to a repetition of
the summaries of each of the three groups of
value dimensions. What can be done and
what is perhaps worth doing is to evaluate
our research procedures.
This exploratory study has shown that
it is possible to extract explicit value posi-
tions from periodical content by setting up
dimensions and coding the positions of au-
thors or quoted speakers within those di-
mensions. The evidence seems to be that
where the analysts already know the society
well, as in the American case here, they
will not learn a great deal that they did not
know already. They can, however, estab-
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FIG. 1. SALIENCE TO THE ELITES OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF DIMENSIONS
(a) Dimensions concerning the economy; (b)
dimensions concerning social and internal politi-
cal affairs; (c) dimensions concerning external
relations.
lish a quantitative basis for comparison with
later time periods, which may be valuable
in making accurate statements about social
change.
When the society is not already intimately
known to the analysts, as in the Soviet case
here, the method is much more rewarding.
Even though explicit statements in periodi-
cals may not always represent the free ex-
pression of those involved, not even the
Communist Party in the Soviet Union suc-
ceeds in seeing to it that the same value
emphasis is reflected in all periodicals. We
have found that the various elites do in
fact express different preferences in many
categories, and we have no reason to sup-
pose that these differences are not genuine.
It is probable that they simply do not ap-
pear as frequently as they would under less
controlled conditions. Even though the
value differences are muted, the small dif-
ferences that do appear undoubtedly hint
at strains that lie below the surface. These
strains become particularly obvious if, in
addition to positive value statements, criti-
cisms of one group by another are recorded.
Even if it be admitted that the explicit
statements do not yield an accurate map of
the value positions in a totalitarian society,
the recording of them does give rise to a
useful body of evidence. The analysis by
salience, for instance, tells a good deal about
the several elites, and it is completely in-
dependent of the genuineness of the explicit
value positions. The relative prominence of
the various elites, calculated from data
showing which elites are most talked about
in the journals of other elites, can also be
revealing.
Beside evidence of modest accomplish-
ment, the study has real weaknesses. The
greatest difficulty we encountered was un-
doubtedly the achievement of intercoder
reliability. Our experience would indicate
that it would take months of training to
obtain 90 percent reliability on material
such as that coded in this study. As stated
earlier, the problem is not in securing reli-
ability on the value position within a dimen-
sion once the coders agree that that dimen-
sion is being discussed. However, since all
degrees of allusiveness are found in written
material, it is almost impossible to find a
rule that will discriminate cases where a
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value position is being taken from cases
where there is a veiled and uncertain ref-
erence to it.
Though not so irritating to the investi-
gators, an equally important shortcoming
lies in the value dimensions themselves.
Life is so complex and yet so seamless a web
that the task of breaking it down into value
dimensions that are meaningful and, for
the purpose in hand, exhaustive is an almost
hopeless one. No matter how carefully a
team of investigators canvasses the field in
advance and thinks through the scheme of
analysis, awkward dimensions and omissions
seem bound to occur. At some point the
investigators will wish they could again re-
vise the dimensions. One is therefore torn
between the desire for extensive pretesting
to perfect the analytical scheme, and the
exigencies of time and cost. One is never
sure that the inevitable compromise repre-
sents an optimum return.
